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I. Introduction: The state, oil, and war.  
 
Three themes have influenced the shape and the direction of Iraq’s economy since the foundation of 
the modern Iraqi state as a League of Nations’ mandate in 1920: the state, oil, and war. While these 
themes appear to be dominant, they should not be understood as isolated from other international, 
regional and national political and economic forces.  
 
The state’s capacity to enforce law and order (regardless of the nature of the political system) has 
always been a major factor in shaping the nature of the Iraqi national economy. The increased 
capacity of the state that proceeded the Ottoman Empire accelerated the emergence of a national 
economy out of fragmented and isolated local economies and the integration into an international 
world market. The state’s influence became most obvious with the nationalization of the oil industry 
in 1972 and the emergence of a state-commanded economy that slowly gave way to economic 
liberalization in the 1980s. The weakening of the state (due to wars and sanctions) became visible in 
the 1990s, and most visible after the second Gulf War and the US-led invasion of 2003. The decline 
of state capacity allowed the formation and consequent consolidation of smuggling and criminal 
networks that operate within the economy.  
 
For the past three decades, Iraq’s economy has been heavily influenced by war. The eight-year 
interstate war with Iran (1980-1988) resulted in a heavy financial debt and subjected the economic 
priorities to the war efforts. The economic damages caused by the war were compounded by the 
subsequent first Gulf War (1991), the international comprehensive sanctions (1990-2003), the 
second Gulf War (2003), the civil war (2006-7), the emergence of the Islamic State (since 2014), and 
the general political instability since 2003. 
 
The most recent episode in Iraq’s political economy was initiated by the US-led occupation in 2003 
and its effort at Iraqi state-building. Upon the occupation of Iraq the US initiated ambitious state-
building efforts that faced multiple challenges leading to a difficult and slow process of 
reconstruction. State institutions, public infrastructure and consequently the economy suffered 
during this decade from multiple episodes of violence, management inefficiencies, allegations of 
corruption, and political instability. While Iraq seems to be making a recovery after decades of 
strenuous economic and political circumstances, a restoration of a state of normalcy and reaching its 
prosperous potential are yet to be achieved.  
 
II. Late Ottoman through the Monarchical period (1831-1958)  
The period from the late Ottoman (1831-1914) through the British occupation (1914-1920) and 
Mandate (1920-1932), and the Monarchy (1932-1958) witnessed radical changes in terms of the 
emergence of a national economy, integration into the world market, discovery of oil in Iraq, and the 
emergence of new wealth that altered the social and political landscapes of the country. 
 
i. Fragmented, subsistence economies.  
Prior to the establishment of the modern Iraqi state under the British League of Nations’ mandate in 
1920, Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire since 1550. Ottoman control was constantly challenged 
and was finally stabilized in 1831 and lasted through the start of British invasion in 1914. Under the 
Ottomans, and due to a number of reasons, the country was composed of “plural, relatively isolated, 
and often virtually autonomous city-states and tribal confederations”.1 During this period, Iraq’s 
economy was fragmented along the different communities and had generally kept subsistence 
economies that were not interdependent.2 This was partly due to the poor communications and 
transportation infrastructure, wherein major Iraqi cities were better linked to other major (non-
Iraqi) economic centers, including in India and Syria, then to Iraqi towns.3 The Ottomans would 
attempt to centralize the state control and subsequently bring about a form of a national economy, 
but it was not until the British occupied Iraq that the process of change became expedited leading to 
many intended and un-intended economic, social, and political consequences.  
 
ii. Integration into the international market—Ottoman beginnings  
British and monarchical policies in Iraq helped expedite the emergence of a national economy and 
the integration into an international market. However, it is worth noting that prior to the British 
occupation of Iraq in 1914, the Iraqi economy was already slowly becoming integrated into a British 
imperial market in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One critical event was the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which combined with “[t]he gradual introduction of steam 
navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers enabled Iraq to become an exporter of grain, mostly to 
the Gulf and India.” While Iraq was still under Ottoman control, the volume and value of its grain 
exports increased a sixty-fold between 1867 and 1913.4  
 
In an effort to increase the state’s tax collection abilities, the Ottomans, under Midhat Pasha (1869-
72), tried to introduce the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 to Iraq.  The Code was meant to organize and 
codify forms of land ownership in order to institute the state’s ability to impose and collect taxes. Up 
to this point, and for a while to come, land in Iraq was generally held collectively by tribes. A tribe’s 
land holding was dependent on its ability to defend it against other tribes. In effect, there were no 
private property mechanisms to enforce the new legal codes. Upon the introduction of land reforms, 
Ottoman land deeds were issued based on hasty evidence, and only those who understood the long-
term significance of this law obtained land deeds and thus became large landowners overnight. The 
inability of the state to enforce private property rights, and collect taxes, defied the main purpose of 
introducing the Code and subsequently led to the termination of issuing land ownership deeds in 
1881. 
 
The gradual integration into the world market, the introduction of private property, and the 
Ottoman’s state attempts at organizing private ownership in order to increase its tax collection 
abilities, introduced an inevitable conflict of interests among the state, tribal leaders and tribesmen. 
Many tribal leaders were transformed by the new Code into big landowners, and their tribesmen, 
who were still expected to defend the land against the Ottoman state and other tribes, were at the 
same time being slowly transformed from fighters defending tribal lands, to farmers growing crops 
for export. These tensions, if they continued, would have led to the decline of the institution of the 
tribe as a sociopolitical and economic unit according to Hana Batatu.5  
 
iii. Mandate and Monarchy: large land ownership and mass migrations 
British policies to ensure political neutrality and/ or support among the population Iraq had 
immense economic consequences on the country that mainly affected the structure of land holdings 
and the demographic landscape. Unlike the Ottomans, the British were able to secure private 
property rights, and had granted lands to tribal leaders in exchange for political support/ neutrality. 
This policy continued throughout the mandate (1920-1932) and monarchy period (1932-1958) and, 
with combination of other policies, resulted in the creation of concentrated large land ownerships in 
the hands of few families.6 These lands became cultivated for the profit of landowners with the help 
of 1926 and 1932 laws that encouraged the use of irrigation pumps and continuous cultivation of 
land. These economic and legal incentives to cultivate the land for financial profit occurred within a 
context wherein the new large landlords had no former knowledge of land cultivation but demanded 
constant production from the farmers. As a result of that, cultivation used wasteful agricultural 
methods that led to the significant decline of land productivity over the course of thirty years.  
 
The 1933 Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators, put extreme financial burdens on the 
land cultivators that included the prohibition of leaving the land if the cultivator was in debt. Adding 
to the poverty and difficult living conditions of Iraqi cultivators, the implementation of the 1933 Law 
led to the initiation of massive escapes from the land, especially in the south where most of the 
cultivate lands were located, to Baghdad and its outskirts forming the future working class of the 
city.7  
 
iv. A growing economic and state infrastructure 
Despite land and tax policies that have led to the economic hardship for a significant number of the 
population and the depletion of agricultural land (among other negative political and social 
consequences), the British and monarchical policies in Iraq resulted in the consolidation of state 
power which allowed the emergence of a previously non-existing national economy.  
 
Due to different reasons and motivations, the monarchy “added to the material factors making for a 
consolidated and more powerful state”.. for example, the threefold increase in “gravel or hard 
surface roads” between 1944 and 1955 mostly in the middle and northern parts of the country.8 
Also, the “administrative machine and security apparatus of the state grew larger.” Dams and 
barrages were “erected in the fifties on the Diyālah, the Lesser Zāb, the upper Euphrates near 
Rāmadī, and the upper Tigris near Sāmarrā’.”9 thus improving the water supply for irrigation and 
protecting Baghadad and the (mostly agricultural) south from floods.  
 
Under the monarchy, British domination of financial institutions, although not economic influence, 
was diminishing as a result of the Iraqi governments creation of its own institutions: the Agricultural 
Bank in 1936; the Rafidain Bank in 1941; the Industrial Bank in 1946; and the Central Bank in 1947. 
Local businessmen created financial houses as well. The railways became a national property in 
1936, and under full Iraqi control in 1952. At the same time, British companies remained the main 
beneficiaries of Iraqi trade providing, for example, 31.2 percent of Iraq’s imports between 1952-
1958.10  
 
v. The Shift to a Rentier Economy 
This surge of infrastructure construction (late 40s, 50s) was animated by the increased flow of cash 
to the treasury from oil revenues. This increased flow was due to two reasons—the oil companies’ 
attempt to punish Iran for nationalizing its oil industry in 1951; and their desire to help improve the 
position of the Iraqi monarchy nationally. Iraqi oil revenues went from 5,286,000 Iraqi Dinars in 1950 
(15.7 percent of the total national revenue) to 13,295,000 ID in 1951, and to 79,888,000 ID in 1958 
(61.7 percent of the total national revenue).11 The surge of oil rents in the hands of the state in the 
1950s, which enabled the state to perform various projects and consolidate its presence, has since 
then become the norm. Since that date Iraq become a country with a rentier economy and a rentier 
state—deriving most of the national income from non-productive economic activities, in this case, 
oil revenues.  
 
Prior to the dependency on oil, Iraq’s agriculture provided the majority of the country’s GDP. In 1911 
it composed 44.3 percent of the total national revenue, and between 20 and 25 percent in the 
1920s. As Iraq’s oil revenues started increasing in the 1930s, the percentage of agricultural revenues 
(rather than the actual volume of production) dropped reaching to a range between 17 and 8 
percent for the decade spanning from 1934 to 1945. The surge of oil revenues in the 1950s lead to a 
major relative drop in agricultural contribution to the national income wherein it reached 8.1 
percent in 1951 and 1.7 percent in 1958.12  
 
The increase in national wealth post 1920 through 1958, thanks mainly to oil and an increasingly 
consolidated state apparatus, was also accompanied by an increase in social inequalities. Most of 
the wealth was concentrated within a small number of families, and most of the generated wealth 
went to foreign oil and trade companies. British firms, even after the creation of Iraqi financial 
institutions, were still the major beneficiaries of economic activities in Iraq.13 These vast inequalities 
became a major factor in the mobilization of various protests and the subsequent military take-over 
of the state apparatus in 1958—an event that lead to the abolishment of the monarchy and the 
establishment of an Iraqi republic. 
  
III. 1970s: Nationalization of the Oil Industry and the Developmental State 
The republican regime that was instated in 1958 remained unstable and suffered from multiple 
coups. At the same time, it ushered the start of a state-commanded economy with the sweeping 
nationalization in 1964 by the Iraqi President Abd al-Salam Arif. The Ba’thist coup of 1968 ushered a 
more stable era in which Saddam Hussein was president of Iraq from 1979 through the US-led 
invasion in 2003. Economically, the first decade of the Ba’thist era (1970s) witnessed two major 
events: the nationalization of the oil industry, and the emergences of the developmental welfare 
state.   
 
i. From the Turkish Petroleum Company to the Ministry of Oil 
Iraq’s oil industry started with the establishment of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1912 as the 
Turkish Petroleum Company. The latter was owned by Deutsche Bank, Royal Dutch/ Shell, a British 
bank that was based in Turkey and called the National Bank of Turkey, and the Arminian 
businessman Calouste Gulbenkian—who also held shares in the British government-controlled 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company.14 But Iraqi oil made its big appearance in 1929, when a British, Dutch 
and American joint oil expedition started drilling near the town of Kirkuk, “from a well known as 
Baba Gurgur Number 1—in which the drill bit had barely passed fifteen hundred feet—that a great 
roar was heard, reverberating across the desert. It was followed by a powerful gusher that reached 
fifty feet above the derrick, carrying in it rocks from the bottom of the whole… Finally, after eight 
and a half days, the well was brought under control. It had flowed, until capped, at ninety-five 
thousand barrels per day.”15 This signaled the start of Iraq becoming one of the major international 
oil producers. In the same year, the ICP was renamed as the Iraq Petroleum Company that was 
owned by a consortium of American oil companies (New East Development Corporation), the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company, Royal Dutch/ Shell, Compagnie Française des Pétroles and Gulbenkian.  
 
In 1960 the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, witnessed the founding of Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) of which Iraq was founding member. After the nationalization of the oil 
industry in 1972, the holdings of the IPC were transferred to the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), 
which was established in 1964. In 1987, INOC was dissolved and merged into the Ministry of Oil. 
Under the new structure, oil exploration and production, transport and refineries were managed by 
14 operating companies reporting to the ministry, while marketing activities fell under the State Oil 
Marketing Organization (SOMO).16  
 
ii. Nationalization of oil and the initiation of a developmental state based on a rentier 
economy 
The first Iraqi president, Abdel Karim Qasim attempted unsuccessfully to nationalize the oil industry. 
Law no. 80 of 1961 annulled concessions to oil companies in areas that were not under exploitation, 
but this law never took effect.17 On June 1st, 1972 the Iraqi government nationalized the IPC – a 
move, along with termination of concessions to oil companies in other major oil producing countries 
(Iran in 1951, Kuwait in 1976, Venezuela in 1976, and Saudi Arabia in 1980) “would mark the demise 
of the twentieth century concessional arrangements that had begun… in 1901.”18  
 
The nationalization of oil lead to a dramatic increase in the oil rent’s percentage of the GDP which 
increased steadily and dramatically reaching the highest ratio to date of 82.5 percent of the GDP in 
1979.19 This ratio was not sustained during the following decades which witnessed what is known as 
the oil glut in the 1980s, and the reduced capacity to produce and export oil due to wars and 
sanctions in the following two decades.  
 
The 1970s witnessed the rise of a developmental welfare state in Iraq that relied mostly on oil 
revenues for its projects. This decade witnessed the reversal of many land laws to the benefit of 
farmers, abolished large private ownership of agricultural lands, introduced universal public 
healthcare and education that reached villages as well as cities, expanded the electrical 
infrastructure, introduced policies to encourage modern industrial agriculture, subsidized basic food 
stipples, and increased the wages of public employees.20 These improvements were reflected in the 
significant increase in the average life expectancy in Iraq. An Iraqi individual was expected to live on 
average until the age of 48 in 1960 (regional average for the MENA was 46.7). By 1977 the average 
went to 61 years old in Iraq, and 56.9 years old in MENA.21  
 
During this decade Iraq initiated an industrial development policy, including import substitution, 
food-processing industries, the expansion of cement and building supplies industry, and developing 
petroleum refining and natural gas processing. There was also a shift towards heavy industry and a 
diversification away from oil.22  
 
In 1975, Iraq signed the Algiers agreement with Iran, which settled a borders’ dispute and ended 
Iranian support to the Kurdish militias in Iraqi Kurdistan. This partly meant that economic 
development plans, including the modernization of the oil and other industries, were freed from 
counter-insurgency military expenditures and helping Iraq become the second largest OPEC oil 
producer/ exporter by 1979.23 By the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s Iraq’s ranking for per-capital 
GDP among the middle and high-middle income countries reaching up to USD 3,346 (constant 2010 
USD) in 1980.24 
 
 
IV. 1980s: War Economy and Debt 
The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) had a devastating effect on the Iraqi economy, and had, at the same 
time, transformed many aspects of it. The war was a military stalemate, but the economy that was 
subjected to it, and fed upon it, was transformed into new directions. Subjecting the economy to 
war efforts meant that development and welfare state-sponsored projects had to decline in favor for 
military expenditures. Another major outcome of the war was the emergence of a huge debt. While 
obtaining data on the economy and social life in Iraq during the Ba’thist period was difficult, the 
1980s were a particularly difficult decade in this regard due to the state’s guarding of this 
information during war time. 
 
i. The economic impact of oil and war 
The industrial and developmental projects of the 1970s were reduced in the 1980s due to the war 
with Iran, and have not since then recovered. Agriculture also suffered—where governmental 
financial support to the sector dropped from 18 percent of total government expenditures in 1976, 
to less than 10 per cent in 1980 and continued to decline during the war.25  
 
Until the start of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq was free of debt and had foreign reserves of 35 billion USD 
by 1980. The war quickly reversed this trend. It is estimated that Iraq acquired between 65 and 85 
billion USD in debt for military assistance, development finance, and export guarantees: 35 to 45 
billion USD to western creditors, and another 30 to 40 billion in assistance from the Gulf states.26 
 
ii. Economic liberalization  
The reduced oil revenue and increasing debt lead the state to initiate an economic liberalization 
campaign in the second half of the decade. One important consequence was a massive privatization 
campaign of state-owned factories. Another development was, in contrast to the policies pursued in 
the 1970s, new policies and regulations that weakened labor were introduced such as the lifting of 
minimum wage regulations and abolishing labor unions.27 At the same time, due to the universal 
military conscription and sending many young men to the war front, a labor shortage took place 
during these years. This led to large-scale import of labor mostly from Egypt and Sudan. The majority 
of those worker would leave Iraq soon after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.28 A third significant 
development was the emergence of contractors, among concentrated number of families, who 
carried government projects with funds that came from oil rent or foreign aid. In a speech regarding 
the size of this new wealth and what is expected from its owners, Saddam Hussein gave a glimpse 
into this phenomenon: “You know that there was only a handful of contractors before the revolution 
[the 1968 coup]… Now, this contractor owns not thousands [of Iraq dinars] but millions…. I was 
informed that he had donated only a pittance. He did not ask himself, ‘Where did I get this fortune? 
Isn’t it thanks to these new circumstances?’”29 
 
V. 1990s: wars, international sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Programme.  
By the end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1989, Iraq was immersed in debt, suffered from 
destruction to its infrastructure (including that of oil), and a reversal of many of the welfare and 
developmental projects. Within a year of the war’s end, Iraq invaded and occupied its neighboring 
country, Kuwait. This event lead to the first Gulf War of 1991 and the introduction of comprehensive 
economic sanctions by United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 that would last until the fall 
of the regime in 2003 and would put the economy into a severe state of weakness.  
 
i. First Gulf War: destruction and economic sanctions.  
The economic devastation incurred on Iraq during the 1980s due to the war, debt, and declining oil 
prices can arguable be considered a main trigger for the 1991 Gulf War. After the end of the war 
with Iran, Iraq wanted the Gulf countries (mainly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) to forgive loans incurred 
during the war. It also accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of exceeding their oil 
production quotas and thus driving down the international price of oil. This tension escalated when 
Iraq accused Kuwait of steaking oil from the Rumailia oilfields, which are located at a disputed 
border between the two countries. On August 2nd 1990, Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait. The Iraqi 
occupation led to the 1991 Gulf War and the international comprehensive sanctions, both of which 
aimed to end this occupation and led to Iraqi withdrawal February 25 1991. 
 
The Gulf War have caused damage to the infrastructure, including transportation, communications, 
water treatment and purification plants, sewage systems, and electricity. This was in addition to 
damages sustained during the war with Iran to the civilian infrastructure and oil facilities. Post-war 
reconstruction, however, was not possible due to the international comprehensive sanctions. The 
sanctions were first put in place to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, but were later extended 
under new conditions related to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.  
 
The sanctions froze all Iraqi assets abroad and put a complete halt on all trade in and out of Iraq 
except for food and medicine. However, because of the inability to generate income, mainly through 
oil sales, Iraq was not able to import sufficient amounts of the permitted items. This, in addition to 
the destruction of the infrastructure, led to a humanitarian crisis during the early years of the 
sanctions.  
 
The scarce availability of medication, vaccines, food staples particularly animal protein, and the 
deteriorating water, sewage and electrical infrastructures led to the spread of malnutrition among 
children and infants, and the emergences of epidemics that were eliminated in Iraq during the 1970s 
and 1980s. A famine situation was avoided due to the government’s introduction of an efficient 
rationing system. The caloric availability prior to 1991 was 120 percent of the standard 
requirements, the rationing system, which was lacking in animal protein, was able to provide 53 
percent of the 1987-89 food energy availability but this figure would drop to 34 percent by 1994. 
Another response to the scarcity of food was the encouragement of agricultural production, but in 
the absence of machinery, spare parts, pesticides, fertilizers, and a functioning irrigation system, this 
policy failed and led to the creation of more problems such as land salinization and the spread of 
malaria along rice fields.30 31 
 
ii. The Oil-for-Food Programme: scope and benefits  
Upon a growing humanitarian crisis, Iraq was allowed to sell limited amount of oil within the terms 
of the Oil-For-Food Programme (UNSC resolution 986 of the year 1995) which were implemented at 
the end of 1996 and continued through the remaining years of the sanctions. The terms of OFF were 
renewable every six months by a UNSC resolution after the review and approval of Iraq’s compliance 
and OFF’s performance by the Sanctions Committee (“the 661 Committee’ created by UNSCR 661). 
The period between two reviews was known as a “Phase”. Iraq was allowed to sell a specified 
amount of oil in each phase. The money generated through those sales was to be deposited in a UN 
escrow account and used to purchase food stuffs and humanitarian goods. Contracts for oil sales 
and the purchase of food and humanitarian goods had to be approved by the 661 Committee. Under 
OFF Iraq sold USD 64.2 billion worth of crude oil.32  
 
OFF was successful, in combination with the government rationing programme, in avoiding a major 
humanitarian situation in Iraq. At the same time, it did not lift the sanctions’ limitations on importing 
sufficient material necessary for the post-war reconstruction and/ or achieving economic sufficiency. 
For example, according to a 2001 UN Secretary-General report, Iraq’s requests for purchasing goods 
for its agricultural sector were mostly put on hold by the 661 Committee.33 By 2002 Iraq imported 
between 80 and 100 percent of its food staples through OFF. But it remained self-sufficient in fruits 
and vegetables.34 
 
After achieving a position among the middle-income and high-middle income countries in the 1970s 
and 1980s, Iraq’s per capita GDP dropped significantly in the 1990s due to the sanctions, reaching a 
low of USD 1,428 (constant 2010 USD) in 1991— dropping under the average for middle-income 
countries. Iraq would recover its position of having higher per capita GDP than the average for 
middle income countries during the OFF years, reaching a high of USD 4,379 (constant 2010 USD) in 
1999.35 At the same time, the average of life expectancy continued to rise in the 1990s. Despite a 
drop in the early 1980s, most likely due to the war with Iran, it continued to rise following a regional 
trend and reaching up to 69 years old in 1998—which was equal to the regional average.36  
 
OFF revenues were also used to pay compensation for claims made for reparations of damages by 
Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion and occupation of 1990. 30 percent of oil sales under OFF were 
dedicated to pay such claims that were authorized by the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(UNCC). This was reduced to 24 percent in December 2000.37 
 
iii. OFF controversies  
OFF was surrounded with controversies of corruption as Iraq was able through the manipulation of 
the programe to general USD 1.5 billion in kickbacks on humanitarian goods contracts and 229 
million USD in illicit payments on oil contracts. It also cultivated an international network of 
patronage by awarding USD 130.3 million to individuals and groups involved in international 
lobbying against the sanctions.38  
 
Despite the controversies, it is worth noting that the scope of corruption associated with OFF was 
limited: the percentage of illicit income, kickbacks, and bribes paid through this programme formed 
only 2.9 percent of the total revenues sold under OFF.39 This income was only 1 tenth of the money 
generated through smuggling schemes during the sanctions regime.  
 
iv. Smuggling 
Smuggling operations in Iraq lasted throughout the period of the sanctions and took multiple forms. 
The most systematic form was through bilateral trade agreements between Iraq and its neighbors 
Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Turkey. Those were known as “trade protocols,” under which Iraq exported 
oil in return for goods and in some cases a smaller percentage of cash. By the end of the sanctions 
those protocols had generated the total value of USD 10 billion in goods and cash.40 41 Turkey, Syria, 
and Jordan had applied for an exemption from the sanctions under Article 50 of the UN Charter, 
which allows for such an exemption if the applying country was considered by the Security Council 
to face “special economic problems” as a result of adhering to the implementation of UNSC-imposed 
sanctions. The 661 Committee “took note” of Jordan’s continuing oil imports from Iraq without 
approving nor prohibiting its trade with Iraq.42 Syria, and Turkey were expressly denied their 
requests.43  
 
Border smuggling also occurred outside these agreements through land and sea. Information 
regarding those activities is sporadic and anecdotal suggesting that oil and other goods (such as 
dates and alcohol) were smuggled for cash and goods at the Iranian, Jordanian, Syrian, Kuwaiti and 
Turkish borders. The only reliable estimate regarding the volume of this trade is based on SOMO’s 
extensive book keeping records of oil trade. Based on those records, between 1997 and 2003 Iraq 
generated USD 1.03 billion in border trade.44  
 
As pointed out by Joseph Sassoon, and Joy Gordon, the smuggling and OFF illicit payments combined 
(between USD 10 and 12 billion), “could not have significantly restored an economy reeling from 
$200 billion in damage from the 1991 war and a loss of GDP on the order of $ 40 billion per year.”45  
 
VI. 2003-2017: Statebuilding, insurgency, civil war, corruption, slow recovery, and 
redefining the terms of control over oil 
In March 2003, the United States led an international coalition that invaded Iraq and toppled the 
ruling regime in what became known as the second Gulf War. The war led to the occupation of Iraq 
(March 2003 – June 2004). Upon the occupation of Iraq, the US initiated ambitious state-building 
efforts that faced multiple challenges leading to a difficult and slow process of reconstruction. State 
institutions, public infrastructure and consequently the economy suffered during this decade from 
multiple episodes of violence, management inefficiencies, allegations of corruption, and political 
instability. While Iraq seems to be making a recovery after decades of strenuous economic and 
political circumstances, a restoration of a state of normalcy and reaching its prosperous potential 
are yet to be achieved.  
 
i. US-led invasion: plans for re-making the economy and their challenges 
Shortly after the occupation of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was installed 
and issued its first regulation in which it clarified its role as exercising,  
powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the 
effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional 
administration, to restore conditions of security and stability, to 
create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine 
their own political future, including by advancing efforts to restore 
and establish national and local institutions for representative 
governance and facilitating economic recovery and sustainable 
reconstruction and development.46 
During its 13-month tenure, the CPA issued sweeping orders that aimed at re-making Iraqi 
political and economic institutions into an open market democracy. These orders and 
regulations covered vast areas of public life from taxes to the dissolution of state and 
government institutions and organizations.47  
 
The two most devastating orders were the dissolution of the armed forces and the de-
Baathification of the Iraqi state institutions and organizations. The dissolution of the armed 
forces contributed to the state of chaos that immediately followed the occupation of Iraq due 
to the lack of policing capabilities of the occupying powers. Post-invasion looting is estimated 
to have cost USD 12 billion. It also arguable contributed to the emergence, the persistence, 
and spread of the Iraqi insurgency against the occupation. The immediate impact of de-
Baathification was the release of 30,000 Iraqi employees from public service, among them 
were middle management experts in vital government ministries and bureaus (including oil, 
finance, economic, local governance, education, energy, and health).  
 
The immediate effect of those policies and post-war immediate disorder led to wide-spread 
halt to all public services. This effect was exaggerated further by the inability of the CPA to 
recruit experts with sufficient experience in their fields and especially those with regional and/ 
or Iraqi expertise, and relied mostly on a ‘revolving door of diplomats.’48 49 
 
Economically, the CPA’s policies mirrored the “shock therapy” structural adjustment programs 
of the mid-1990s in some former Eastern European countries. Iraq’s state-owned companies, 
except in the hydrocarbons sector, were to be privatized.50 While this was hoped to 
strengthen the Iraqi economy, the inability to build institutional strength and efficiency and 
the slow reconstruction and upgrading of the national infrastructure proved to cause long 
term obstacle to economic growth and sustainability.  
 
Iraq’s oil production between 2003 and 2004 was below its OFF years’ levels. While in 2000 
Iraq produced 2613 thousand barrels per day (KBD), in 2003 it only produced 1344 KBD and 
2030 KBD in 2004. Despite the lower levels of production, Iraq benefited from increasing oil 
prices—while the Brent crude oil price per barrel was USD 25.02 in 2002, by 2004 it was USD 
38.27 per barrel.51  
 
Economic indicators during the occupation period mostly benefited from the increased 
international oil prices and the aid money that was pouring into the country. These two 
factors have helped keep the GDP per capita on similar levels as pre-2003. In 2002, the GDP 
per capita was USD 3,880 (constant 2010 USD), it remained at a comparable level in 2003 
(USD 3,792) despite the decreased productivity of the oil sector.52   
 
The main source of foreign financial assistance came from the US wherein between 2003 and 
2012 it provided USD 60-63 billion for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. Of this amount, 
USD 53.25 billion was actually spent. The major beneficiaries of this aid in Iraq were large 
corporations such as Bechtel, Fluor, Raytheon and Kellogg.53 
 
Priority in reconstruction was given to the repair and upgrade of the electricity sector—which 
in addition of domestic usage, is essential for medical services, industry, and the powering of 
the oil sector.54 With the initiation of an anti-occupation insurgency in August 2003, security 
took priority over electricity, and continued to be the first funding priority for many years to 
come due to the escalating violence.55  
 
ii. Violence: draining economic resources and thwarting recovery  
Soon after the March 2003 invasion, a violent insurgency erupted in August and started spreading 
across the country. It targeted infrastructures, contract workers, and occupation forces. This was in 
addition to the emergence of violent organized criminal activities. Shortly after the transfer of 
sovereignty from the CPA to an interim Iraqi government in June 2004, a new violent episode 
erupted. Between 2006 and 2007 Iraq witnessed for the first time since the foundation of the Iraqi 
state in 1920 an inter-communal civil war (2006-2007). In June 2014, the Islamic State (IS) militant 
group captured territories in northern and western Iraq. The Iraqi forces has since then made 
considerable success in skirting back the IS’s territories, however, the economic and social 
consequences are continuing to this date. These episodes have delayed reconstruction efforts due to 
direct and indirect targeting of infrastructure and reconstruction locations, the further destruction 
to the infrastructure, and the shifting of resources from development and reconstruction to security 
enhancement efforts. As of 2015, the IS insurgency has caused loss in economic production in the 
territories under its control, infrastructure destruction and the disruption of trading routes. It also 
led to the internal displacement of 4 million Iraqis and an influx of Syrian refugees from the war in 
Syria—adding more pressure on the local economic resources and creating further unemployment.56  
 
iii. Oil and oil controversies 
Iraq’s economy continues to rely on the oil sector despite the difficulties that this sector continues 
to face in terms of a weakened infrastructure and the slow pace of reconstruction. Despite the lifting 
of the sanctions, Iraq was not able to exceed its pre-2003 production levels until 2012 when it 
produced 3116 KBD. This level has since then been increasing and had reached 4,465.1 KBD in 2016. 
At the same time, oil prices have been increasing since 2004 when a barrel of crude oil was priced at 
USD 38.27 and continued to increase reaching a very high price of USD 111.67 in 2012. However, the 
prices have since 2014 been decreasing and as of 2016 it was USD 43.73 per barrel.57 According to a 
2016 World Bank report, Iraq’s oil production has been slower than expected due to the effect that 
slow reconstruction and ongoing violence have on the ability to improve storage facilities, pumping, 
and pipeline capacity in the south. Despite all of that, in 2015 Iraq produced 144 billion barrels, thus 
ranking as the second biggest oil producer in OPEC after Saudi Arabia. And it continues to have the 
fifth largest proven oil reserves in the world.58 
 
Since 2003 the Iraqi political system went significant changes, leading to the creation of a federal 
system. Under the federal system, the Kurdish Region has its own regional government (KRG). Since 
the imposition of the sanctions in the 1990s, this region has enjoyed relative economic autonomy. 
Under the federal system, the KRG has been in constant dispute with the central government on the 
mechanisms and terms on which oil resources and revenues should be managed. At the centre of 
these mechanisms is the Hydrocarbons law, first proposed in the Iraqi Parliament in 2007 but has 
since faced many objections and controversy. The law would allow foreign oil companies to have 
long-term contracts in Iraq and would give different regions the right to award contracts to those 
companies. The INOC would be restructured as an independent holding company, and a Federal 
Council would be created to oversee national oil policy. The law would also allocate oil revenues 
among the 18 governorates of Iraq based on population level.59 The terms of the law, however, 
remain a point of dispute between KRG and Baghdad. In November 2014, the KRG and the central 
government reached an agreement on the mechanisms of this law as they pertain to the Kurdish 
region, but this agreement was suspended by mid-2015 with the KRG increasing its independent oil 
sales beyond the agreement, and Baghdad’s transfer of oil revenue funds were lower than what was 
agreed upon.60 
 
iv. National debt  
Iraq was able have the majority of its external debt eradicated, thus freeing the economy from one 
of its main burdens that had accumulated over the 1980s and 1990s. According to 2017 figures from 
the Central Bank of Iraq, Iraq’s total debt was USD 140 billion in 2003. After negotiations with the 
IMF and the Paris Club, 80 percent of this debt was cancelled except for the debt incurred from the 
Gulf countries (USD 45 billion). 61 By 2013, the total government debt was USD 73.1 billion, USD 59.3 
billion of which are external debt. It is estimated that the total debt in 2016 reached USD 114.6 
billion (66.7 percent of the GDP), USD 67.5 billion of which are external debt.62  
 
v. Corruption allegations and inefficiencies  
While the various episodes of violence and disorder since 2003 have had a significant impact on the 
reconstruction and recovery of Iraq’s economy and infrastructure, allegations of corruption and 
management inefficiencies have also been reported as major factors in causing this delay. The 
spread of institutional corruption and inefficiencies has been unprecedented in the past few 
decades. Since the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi government there have been many accusations 
of widespread institutional corruption by local and international observers.63 Iraqi institutions still 
suffer from corruption and inefficiencies. It still scores very poorly on the index of Transparency 
International corruption perception, where in 2016 it was ranked at number166 out of 176 
countries.64  
 
vi. Reforms and a slow recovery 
In 2015 demonstrations across the country demanded an end to corruption and the restoration of 
essential services, mainly electricity. These demonstrations were met with vast reforms at reducing 
governmental redundancies, inefficiencies and corruption. By the end of 2015 the six ministries were 
eliminated, others were consolidated and a number of senior government positions were 
eliminated. While these reforms are being initiated, their implementation has been slow and 
affected by resistance from those who are negatively affected by them.65  
 
Iraq’s recovery is still very slow and the country is still suffering from decades of compounded 
damage to its infrastructure during the various wars and the delays in reconstruction due to 
sanctions (1990s), and in post-2003 due to the poor security situation and institutional corruption 
and inefficiencies. According to the World Bank, as of 2015, electricity supply is rarely higher than 12 
hours per day, only 50 percent of the population receive garbage collection and sewage services, 
and access to clean water is only 63 percent in rural areas. As a result of the government’s war with 
IS and the influx of internal refugees and Syrian refugees, one third of the population is in need of 
humanitarian aid.66  
 
Until 2017 Iraq is still considered by the World Bank as a fragile state, along with other regional 
countries such as Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.67 While life expectancy continued to improve 
regionally since the 1960s, reaching 73 years old by 2015, Iraq’s life expectancy remains at its levels 
from the late 1990s of 69 years old.68 Since 2003 the GDP per capita has never reached above the 
upper-middle income average as it did in parts of the 1980s and 1990s. In 2004 the GDP per capita 
was USD 3,782 (constant 2010 USD), and in 2015 it was USD 5,686 (constant 2010 USD).69 
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